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Strategic Trends 2012:  Key Developments in Global Affairs. Daniel Möckli, ed.  
Zurich:  Center for Security Studies, 2012.  ISBN:  978-3-905696-3. 
www.sta.ethz.ch/. 
     This is the third annual compendium of essays from this Swiss security studies 
research institute analyzing international strategic issues.  The introductory 
thematic essay seeks to present how international security trends are moving the 
world from a multipolar direction to a polycentric focus.  This same introduction 
also contends that global leadership to resolve international political and security 
problems is lacking and that this will cause political fragmentation and 
polarization to continue.  A result of this fragmentation and polarization is that 
this will produce international economic, societal, structural, and technological 
interdependencies framing state behavior and international relations and 
consequently limiting the extent to which these divergences will produce non-
governance and large-scale confrontation in a globalized world.  Consequently, in 
the words of one author, these divergences: “explain why geopolitics is a much 
more complex phenomenon today than at any time before”[1]. 
     These security divergences are elaborated on in five individually-authored 
essays addressing China’s increasing international assertiveness, Europe’s 
strategic weakness stemming from its debt and structural financial problems, sub-
Saharan African conflict, energy’s changing geopolitics due to the rise of 
unconventional energy sources, and the militarization of cybersecurity. 
      The China essay, written by Prem Mahadevan, stresses how Chinese economic 
growth has helped enhance its military power.  Key questions stemming from this 
development include whether or not China’s geopolitical rise will be peaceful, 
whether Chinese growth can be sustained as western demand for Chinese 
products and services declines, whether China can maintain domestic political 
cohesion, to what extent increasing nationalism within China will affect its 
geopolitical stature in the Asia-Pacific region, and how the U.S. might respond an 
increasingly assertive China. 
     Mahadevan contends that China sees itself as a power reclaiming its traditional 
importance in the international geopolitical order prior to its 19th century decline 
as a result of its internal factionalism exploited by assertive western powers such 
as the United Kingdom[2].  He mentions that the size of China’s economy tripled 
between 2001-2008 and that there is significant concern within China that this 
economic growth could slow after 2012 to which Beijing has responded by 
increasing interest rates and deflating a real estate bubble engendered by 
prolonged speculative investment[3].  
     This chapter also stresses how restrictions on rural to urban migration have 
produced a two-tiered class system impeding social mobility with rural workers 
receiving lower incomes 3.5 times less than their urban counterparts which has 
produced protests and violence over illegal land acquisition.  It goes on to 
emphasize that Sino-African trade has increased over 1,000% in the last decade 
and China’s willingness to enter into trade agreements with countries regardless 
of their domestic political and economic institutions.  China also seeks to promote 
noninterference in other country’s internal affairs as demonstrated by its veto of 
a February 2012 UN Security Council resolution on Syria and in 2011 its national 
police budget became larger than the national defense budget producing a 
greater emphasis on internal security in tension-filled areas such as Xinjiang 
province and Tibet[4]. 
     Chinese assertiveness is also demonstrated by its defense budget increasing at 
an annual inflation adjusted-rate of 12% between 2001-2011.  This enhanced 
military assertiveness is also demonstrated by China learning from U.S. military 
operations in the Middle East that it cannot hope to win a head on military 
confrontation with the U.S., but instead seeks to target the U.S. where it is most 
vulnerable in intelligence and logistics by denying sea-borne U.S. forces access to 
operational bases near China, targeting US ships with ballistic missiles, and using 
cyber measures and anti-satellite systems to disrupt U.S. command and control 
systems[5]. 
     Mahadevan correctly concludes that China’s government has not adopted its 
policies to accept secondary status in the world system, that it is unlikely to 
develop the requisite diplomatic, economic, and military strength to rival the U.S, 
and that if China’s strategic community is unable to accept limits on China’s 
strategic ascension it could produce a military miscalculation and confrontation 
with the U.S[6]. 
     The decline of the European Union (EU) due to its acute debt and structural 
financial problems is discussed in the second chapter.  EU’s economic problems 
include an 10% unemployment rate in early 2012, drastic reductions in defense 
spending limiting the power projection ability of EU countries, and debt-to-GDP 
ratios exceeding 80% by 2012 and surpassing 100% in Greece, Ireland, Italy, and 
Portugal along with only thirteen of the 27 member EU states having debt to GDP 
ratios of below 60%[7]. 
     These high levels of debt have caused considerable political and economic 
turmoil in EU countries with many having to implement tough austerity measures 
including government spending cuts and tax increases which have produced 
violent unrest in the streets and produced changes in government in countries as 
diverse as France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.  It has also resulted 
in EU financial support bailout packages for these countries totaling $ 1.302 
trillion as of early 2012[8].   This crisis has also increased Germany’s economic and 
political influence within Europe, caused increased public disillusionment with the 
highly centralized nature of EU economic and policy decision-making, placed the 
Euro’s long-term viability in question, caused many to question the EU’s long-
term sustainability, increased divisions between more affluent northern and less 
affluent southern EU members, and is increasing concern in many countries over 
the loss of national sovereignty due to the EU’s apparent inability to resolve these 
fiscal crises. 
     These events may increase Chinese economic investment and political 
influence in Europe and chapter author Daniel Möckli is right to hypothesize that 
internal crisis management is likely to dominate EU policymaking for the 
foreseeable future.  However, his analysis could be strengthened by addressing 
topics such as Europe’s aging population and declining population growth, the 
problems posed by its growing Islamic population and efforts to successfully 
assimilate that population into European cultural, economic, and political norms 
during an era of protracted economic strain, Europe’s dangerous dependence on 
Russian energy supplies, and a popular mindset that governmental largesse, 
instead of individual initiative and responsibility, should provide for national and 
personal economic needs. 
     In her chapter on African instability, An Jacobs stresses positive trends in this 
continent’s developments such as some democratization and economic growth 
but also emphasizes ongoing negative trends such as severe conflicts in sub-
Saharan Africa based on ethnic and religious differences and conflict over natural 
resources.  Regions experiencing persistent conflict include the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Somalia and adjacent territories, and Sudan and newly 
independent South Sudan. 
     Some of these conflicts feature indigenous disputes within these countries 
while others feature transnational groups such as Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance 
Army whose area of operations encompasses the Central African Republic, South 
Sudan, and Uganda.  External economic investment in Africa by the BRIC powers 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) is also a mixed blessing as it brings foreign capital 
into these countries to facilitate some economic development.  However, much of 
this development is focused on mineral resource extraction with individuals and 
governments in these countries believing that such investment is more concerned 
with promoting BRIC countries increased demand for natural resources instead of 
promoting sustainable development within these countries.  This concern was 
partially reflected in Zambia’s 2011 presidential election as the victorious 
candidate Michael Sata campaigned on an anti-Chinese platform expressing 
concern that Chinese investment was exploiting Zambian resources and workers 
instead of enhancing national development[9]. 
     The persistent role of corruption by African political elites is also addressed as 
is the influence of natural resources such as coltan (a rare earth metal critical in 
electronic device development) with 80% of global coltan/tantalum reserves 
being in the Democratic Republic of Congo[10].   Additional examples of ethno-
religious conflict include the African vs. Arab confrontation in Sudan’s Darfur 
region, Sudanese support for Islamist uprisings in Eritrea, Somalia, and Uganda, 
and the influence of the Islamist Al-Shaabab in Somalia.  The role of maritime 
piracy in areas as far-flung as the Gulf of Aden, Kenya, Tanzania, and the 
Seychelles Islands is also examined. 
     Jacobs rightly stresses positive developments such as multilateral African 
efforts to deploy peacekeeping forces AMISOM to Somalia, the continuing 
contradictory Chinese emphasis on trade promotion and resource extraction 
without caring about domestic political or human rights conditions in African 
countries, and ultimately stressing that only a miniscule amount of Chinese 
investment improves the average lives of Africans.  Her analysis could be 
strengthened further by discussing the rise of the dangerous Islamist Boko Haram 
movement in Nigeria and how to resolve the problems caused by the Mugabe 
regime in thwarting Zimbabwean economic and political development. 
     In his energy chapter, Jonas Grätz believes the emergence of unconventional 
oil and gas signifies a break with established energy supply trends.  He goes on to 
contend that the geographic locations of these unconventional resources e.g. 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Congo, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) enhances supply 
diversity instead of concentration.  Additional attributes of this supply diversity is 
that production of these commodities is driven more by economics than politics 
and that it will enhance consumer choice in global energy geopolitics. 
     This section goes on to mention that oil demand grew by an average of 1.4% 
annually over the past decade with much of this growth coming from Asia and 
that 2011 was OPEC’s best year ever for revenue despite Iranian and Libyan 
political tensions.  It goes on to mention that governmental investment 
constraints are a key cause of high oil prices, that existing oil reserves will meet 
global demand for over 40 years, that access to investment opportunities is 
restricted by many oil exporting countries, that national oil companies of these 
countries hold nearly 88% of conventional reserves and do not have the 
incentives and financial support to upgrade their infrastructure, and that  
investment risk in petroleum industries has increased due to high and volatile 
taxes and domestic resource nationalism[11]. 
     Canada and Venezuela are major sources of unconventional oil with oil sands 
and extra-heavy oil reserves respectively in these countries.  U.S. oil production 
could increase drastically if federal restrictions were eased on drilling in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge and other federal lands and waters.  Liquefied natural 
gas and shale gas reserves remain untapped in many countries and environmental 
concerns such as fracking will have to be resolved before these resources can be 
optimally accessed. 
     China is likely to continue increasing its oil imports from the Middle East and 
Africa and will have to transport these and other commodities from and through  
volatile areas such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca.  China is gradually 
increasing its naval power projection capability to provide security for this traffic 
and is also looking at Canada as a possible oil supplier in order to counteract 
Russian energy geopolitical aspirations in northeast Asia. 
   Large-scale potential U.S. exploitation of domestic natural gas resources such as 
the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and environs and the Bakken Oil range in 
North Dakota and environs will increase U.S. clout in international energy markets 
and may have already resulted in annual U.S. oil imports accounting for only 45% 
of consumption in 2011[12]. 
    There are more sound than unsound observations in this chapter.  An example 
of a poor assessment is the author’s claim (p. 96) that the Obama Administration 
decision to reject the Keystone XL Pipeline link to the Canadian oil sands may be a 
wise geopolitical strategy.  In reality, this only exacerbates U.S. dependence on 
unreliable foreign oil sources.  Grätz is also wise to mention the troubling 
dependence of many European countries on Russian oil and natural gas, their lack 
of military capabilities to uphold global energy markets, their acute dependence 
on US willingness and ability to provide access to these markets, Germany and the 
United Kingdom’s fixation on decarbonization and renewable energy and 
Germany’s abysmal decision to jettison nuclear power, which he contrasts 
unfavorably with Poland’s efforts to prioritize supply security and economic 
competitiveness. 
  The last chapter on the militarization of cyber security by Miriam Dunn Cavelty is 
the weakest one in this collection.  Its strengths include listings of various national 
cyber security policy documents, descriptions of various kinds of cyber conflict 
such as cyber terrorism and cyber crime, and definitions of types of cyber 
malware and attack nodes including spyware and Trojan horse.  Unfortunately, 
the author is a proponent of “critical security studies” and claims that U.S. 
policymakers have politicized this issue.  She goes on to audaciously claim that 
there is no identifiable enemy threatening U.S. governmental, military and 
commercial cyber networks[13].   Additional claims in this chapter include alleging 
that cyber security “discourse” is American in origin without recognizing that it is 
a global phenomenon, and that it primarily affects businesses without affecting 
military or government systems.  This appallingly smug European coffee shop 
naivete, unfortunately, fails to reflect the vast volumes of data and analysis 
demonstrating the acute threats U.S. and other western governments and 
militaries face from state-sponsored information warfare from countries such as 
China and Russia and non-state cyber security threats from self-appointed 
hacktivist groups like Anonymous and Wikileaks.  It also fails to consider the 
extensive financial resources and human capital these governments and military 
invest in to adapt to and seek to counter these continually evolving threats[14]. 
     Despite the extensive flaws in the concluding chapter, the other chapters in 
this annual compendium contain insights that making this an informative and, 
occasionally, enlightening analysis of current and emerging international 
geopolitical trends and developments. 
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